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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Kenneth McBroom pled guilty to and was convicted of 
one count of possession of child pornography in violation of 
18 U.S.C. S 2252(a)(4). McBroom moved the district court 
for a downward departure pursuant to U.S. Sentencing 
Guideline S 5K2.13 (policy statement) on the ground that he 
suffered from a significantly reduced mental capacity. 
Finding that McBroom was able, at the time of the offense, 
to absorb information in the usual way and to exercise the 
power of reason, the district court concluded that McBroom 
was ineligible for a downward departure. 
 
We believe that the district court could have considered 
the possibility that McBroom suffered from a volitional 
impairment which prevented him from controlling his 
behavior or conforming it to the law. We will, therefore, 
vacate McBroom's sentence and remand for resentencing so 
that the district court may consider this possibility in the 
first instance. 
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I. 
 
As a child, McBroom suffered years of sexual abuse at 
the hands of his father. As an adult, McBroom abused 
alcohol and drugs, and he viewed vast amounts of 
pornography. McBroom contends that the abuse he 
endured as a child caused him to suffer from a significantly 
reduced mental capacity such that he felt compelled to 
possess child pornography he downloaded from the Internet 
-- despite his ability to process information, to reason, and 
to understand the difference between right and wrong. 
 
McBroom detailed his abusive childhood in an 
uncontradicted affidavit submitted to the district court: 
 
       All outward appearances of my family were positive 
       but deceiving. . . . 
 
       I do not know when the sexual abuse began. I have 
       vague recollections of being a young boy and having 
       him bathe me, and sensing his spending what seemed 
       to be an inordinate amount of time washing my penis. 
       I suppose I was four or five at the time. 
 
       I have clear memories of the abuse from about the 
       age of ten onward. . . . Two or three times a week, after 
       we had gone to bed, my father . . . would come to my 
       bed, sit on the edge, and begin rubbing my back or 
       chest. He would soon find his way to my penis. He 
       would pull my pajamas off, fondle me for a while, and 
       then start performing oral sex. On occasion he would 
       take my hand and put it on his penis and tell me to 
       rub it. . . . 
 
       The sexual abuse did not occur exclusively in the 
       evenings. It also took place on occasions when my 
       father and I happened to be alone in the house during 
       the day. It also occurred on a regular basis when my 
       father would take me on one of his frequent business 
       trips. . . . 
 
       There were also a few instances in which my father 
       took Polaroid pictures of me naked. . . . 
 
       This routine continued for about five years, until I 
       was 15 years old. 
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McBroom Aff., PP 3-9. 
 
While attending college in New Orleans, McBroom began 
to "develop an interest in pornography," and he would "go 
to peep shows and pornography shops in downtown New 
Orleans." Id. at P 15. McBroom also began to drink 
excessively. After graduation, McBroom attended law school 
and was married. While in law school, McBroom drank 
every day, and he "developed an affinity for cocaine." He 
also continued to "visit" peep shows and pornography 
shops. Id. at P 18. 
 
During McBroom's first year in law school, he was asked 
to testify at his father's trial on charges that his father 
sexually molested a neighbor's son. Because he 
remembered seeing his father with the boy on many 
occasions, McBroom firmly believed that his father was 
guilty. Nonetheless, McBroom testified that he had a 
healthy relationship with his father, and he did not reveal 
the sexual abuse he had endured. McBroom's father was 
acquitted. McBroom's experience on the witness stand filled 
him with "shame and disgust," and he continues to express 
concern and remorse for the alleged victim of his father's 
abuse. Id. at PP 19-20. 
 After he graduated from law school, McBroom and his 
wife moved to New Jersey, where they had a son. McBroom 
clerked for a judge for one year and began working as an 
associate at a law firm in Roseland, New Jersey. At least 
once per week, McBroom stopped at peep shows in Newark 
on his way home from work. McBroom developed an after- 
work routine whereby he would purchase and consume a 
six-pack of beer and go to the peep shows before returning 
home. Id. at PP 21-23. 
 
McBroom began using cocaine, and he was soon 
spending in excess of $300 per week on drugs. Without his 
wife's knowledge, McBroom acquired several credit cards to 
fund his cocaine and alcohol purchases. McBroom was 
unable to repay the balances of these credit cards, however, 
and three banks have obtained judgments against him. Id. 
at P 24. 
 
McBroom and his wife had a second son. In 1983, 
McBroom's wife discovered cocaine and receipts from credit 
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card cash advances in McBroom's briefcase. The McBrooms 
began seeing a therapist. In 1984, McBroom disclosed to 
the therapist that his father had sexually abused him. This 
was the first time McBroom disclosed the abuse he had 
suffered. That day, McBroom told his wife about the abuse. 
McBroom did not reveal his "fascination" with peep shows 
and pornography, however, and he continued to go to peep 
shows, view pornography, and abuse alcohol and cocaine 
throughout his therapy. Id. at PP 29-31. 
 
Although the Roseland law firm was "very pleased" with 
the quality of McBroom's work, McBroom left the firm and 
began working for a firm in Jersey City. During this time, 
McBroom's wife asked him to leave, and the McBrooms 
separated. McBroom subsequently moved in with another 
woman. He then left the Jersey City law firm and entered 
an inpatient alcohol and drug treatment program. Id. at 
PP 32-33. 
 
McBroom remained sober for five months, but he began 
drinking again, and soon he "was back to where [he] had 
been." McBroom's wife divorced him. During this time, 
McBroom was able to work on a per diem basis for other 
attorneys. McBroom "never received any complaints from 
any of the attorneys for whom [he] did this work, and in 
fact was being asked to handle an increasingly large volume 
and variety of matters including closings, motions, 
depositions, brief-writing and actual trial work." Id. at P 34. 
 In 1989, McBroom began working for a law firm in 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey. Soon thereafter, McBroom 
admitted himself into a rehabilitation program. That 
program was unsuccessful, however, and McBroom began 
to use cocaine and alcohol once again. Throughout this 
period, McBroom continued to visit peep shows and 
pornography stores in Newark; he also began to visit 
similar facilities in New York City. Id. at P 35. 
 
McBroom's father died in 1990. Prior to his death, 
McBroom's father apologized to McBroom "for what he had 
done." McBroom's father then revealed to McBroom's 
mother what had occurred, and he disclosed that he had 
also been sexually abused as a child. Id. at P 36. 
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In early 1991, McBroom moved into his own apartment. 
McBroom began to consume "massive amounts of alcohol 
and cocaine." In addition to continued visits to the peep 
shows, McBroom began purchasing "all sorts of 
pornography magazines." He also "developed an interest in 
phone sex," and his telephone bill for one two-month period 
exceeded $650, a bill McBroom paid with money he 
borrowed from his mother. Id. at P 38. 
 
McBroom entered his third rehabilitation program in 
1991. Although McBroom began drinking alcohol shortly 
after leaving this program, he has not used cocaine since 
that time. McBroom remained with the Englewood Cliffs law 
firm for three years. McBroom "handled a case load of 
approximately 65 active litigation files [and] had 
approximately seven or eight completed jury trials during 
this period." Id. at 39-42. 
 
McBroom left the Englewood Cliffs firm in 1992, 
"determined to make it on [his] own" as a sole practitioner. 
Unfortunately, with no one to account to either at home or 
at work, McBroom "drank [him]self into oblivion." McBroom 
also began to engage in self-mutilation. He would often 
place lit cigarettes on the back of his hand, and on one 
occasion he cut through the skin and muscle of his left 
forearm and right hand with a razor blade. In addition, 
McBroom was hospitalized on six separate occasions with 
acute alcohol-induced pancreatitis. Id. at 43-46. 
 
McBroom entered his fourth rehabilitation program in 
1993. McBroom got drunk on the day after his release from 
that program. On December 28, 1993, a female 
acquaintance took McBroom to a meeting of Alcoholics 
Anonymous. McBroom has been sober since that first 
meeting; McBroom attends at least one Alcoholics 
Anonymous meeting every day, and he also attends many 
"Lawyers Concerned for Lawyers" meetings. Id. at PP 47-49. 
 
McBroom began a romantic relationship with the woman 
who brought McBroom to the Alcoholics Anonymous 
meeting. In 1994, McBroom gave up his apartment and 
moved in with the woman. At the time of his move, 
McBroom threw away all of the pornography magazines 
which he had accumulated. McBroom "no longer had the 
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imperious urge to visit peep shows or to stare for hours at 
pornography magazines." Id. at P 50. 
 
In late 1994, McBroom purchased a personal computer 
for the apartment to be used in his work as a sole 
practitioner. McBroom "soon discovered the Internet," and 
in a short time he "discovered the wealth of pornography 
available on the Internet." "Amaze[d] at the volume of 
available material," McBroom discovered "pornography of 
types [he] had never before seen . . . includ[ing] child 
pornography, bestiality, masochism, bondage and every 
imaginable sexual fetish." Id. at PP 51-53. 
 
For McBroom, "[t]he amazement turned to fascination, 
and ultimately to obsession." According to McBroom, 
"[e]very time I turned the computer on there were hundreds 
of new pictures depicting all sorts of pornography. . . . 
When I wasn't sitting at the computer looking at this stuff, 
I was thinking about looking at it. I thought nothing of 
spending three consecutive hours at the computer at a 
single sitting." Approximately twenty-five percent of the 
images McBroom received constituted child pornography. 
Id. at PP 54-56. 
 
About one month before the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation executed the search warrant that led to the 
sentence that is the subject of this appeal, McBroom 
learned that the Bureau was investigating his activity. 
Despite this awareness, McBroom continued to view this 
material and to store it on his computer's hard drive. Id. at 
PP 57-58. 
 
II. 
 
A. 
 
On September 22, 1995, a federal grand jury sitting in 
Newark, New Jersey, returned a three-count indictment 
charging McBroom with one count of knowingly 
transporting child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 2252(a)(1), one count of knowingly receiving child 
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 2252(a)(2), and one 
count of knowingly possessing child pornography in 
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violation of 18 U.S.C. S 2252(a)(4). On April 22, 1996, 
pursuant to a written plea agreement, McBroom pled guilty 
to count three.1 
 
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
S 3231. At sentencing, the district court noted that under 
the Sentencing Guidelines, the crime of possession of 
materials depicting a minor engaged in sexually explicit 
conduct has a base offense level of thirteen. U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual S 2G2.4(a) (1995).2 Because 
the material involved a prepubescent minor or a minor 
under the age of twelve, section 2G2.4(b)(1) provided for an 
increase of two levels.3 Pursuant to section 3E1.1(a), the 
district court granted a two-point downward adjustment for 
acceptance of responsibility. The total offense level was 
therefore thirteen. 
 
The district court found that McBroom had a total of two 
criminal history points based on three separate convictions 
for driving while intoxicated. U.S.S.G. S 4A1.1(c) (one of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Following entry of the plea, McBroom gave notice to the New Jersey 
Office of Attorney Ethics as required by New Jersey Court Rules. 
McBroom agreed to surrender temporarily his license to practice law 
pending resolution of his fitness to practice law by the New Jersey 
Supreme Court, and he obtained non-legal work for a newspaper. 
McBroom Aff., at PP 73-74. 
 
2. Effective November 1, 1996, this crime has a base offense level of 
fifteen. See U.S.S.G. S 2G2.4(a) (rev. supp. May 1, 1997). 
 
3. The presentence report recommended an additional two-point upward 
adjustment pursuant to section 2G2.4(b)(2), but the United States did 
not seek this adjustment at sentencing and the district court accepted 
McBroom's objection to the applicability of that section. 
 
Section 2G2.4(b)(2) applies when the offense involves possession of ten 
or more books, magazines, periodicals, films, videotapes, or other items 
containing a visual depiction involving the sexual exploitation of a 
minor. 
McBroom possessed ten to twenty files on his computer's hard drive, and 
each file contained one image of child pornography. Finding that section 
2G2.4(b)(2) did not provide guidance on how to count images in 
computer files on a single computer hard drive, the district court 
declined to enhance McBroom's offense level pursuant to that section. 
Effective November 1, 1996, an increase of two levels is provided where 
the defendant's possession of the material resulted from the defendant's 
use of a computer. U.S.S.G. S 2G2.4(b)(3) (rev. supp. May 1, 1997). 
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convictions was not counted pursuant to U.S.S.G. 
S 4A1.2(e)). McBroom's criminal history category was 
therefore II. U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A. For a total offense level 
of thirteen and a criminal history category of II, the 
Sentencing Guidelines provide for a sentence offifteen to 
twenty-one months in prison. Id. 
 
B. 
 
1. 
 
A district court may depart from the sentence established 
by the applicable guideline if the court finds that there 
exists "an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, 
or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by 
the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines 
that should result in a sentence different from that 
described." 18 U.S.C. S 3553(b); U.S.S.G.S 5K2.0, p.s. In 
determining whether a circumstance was adequately taken 
into consideration, the sentencing court shall consider 
"only the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and 
official commentary of the Sentencing Commission." 18 
U.S.C. S 3553(b). 
 
In subpart 5K2 of the guidelines, the Commission 
identifies some of the factors that it did not take into 
account fully in formulating the guidelines. U.S.S.G. 
S 5K2.0, p.s. Some of these factors recognize that an 
upward departure may be warranted in certain 
circumstances, see, e.g., U.S.S.G. S 5K2.7, p.s. (upward 
departure may be warranted where the defendant's conduct 
resulted in the significant disruption of a governmental 
function), while other factors recognize that a downward 
departure may sometimes be justified, see, e.g., U.S.S.G. 
S 5K2.10, p.s. (downward departure may be warranted 
where the victim's wrongful conduct contributed 
significantly to provoking the offense behavior). The factors 
contained in subpart 5K2 are the so-called "encouraged 
factors." If a potential departure factor is an encouraged 
factor, the sentencing court is authorized to depart if the 
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applicable guideline does not already take it into account. 
Koon v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 2045 (1996).4 
 
In contrast, some characteristics are "not ordinarily 
relevant to the determination of whether a sentence should 
be outside the applicable guideline range." U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, 
Pt. H, intro. comment. These so-called "discouraged factors" 
include age, education and vocational skills, and physical 
condition. U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. H. If a potential departure 
factor is a discouraged factor, or an encouraged factor 
already taken into account by the applicable guideline, the 
court should depart "only if the factor is present to an 
exceptional degree or in some other way makes the case 
different from the ordinary case where the factor is 
present." Koon, 116 S.Ct. at 2045. Finally, certain 
"forbidden factors" are not relevant in the determination of 
a sentence and may not be considered by the sentencing 
court. Id. These factors include race, sex, and national 
origin. U.S.S.G. S 5H1.10, p.s.5  
 
With limited exceptions, mental and emotional conditions 
are discouraged factors; that is, they are not ordinarily 
relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted. 
U.S.S.G. S 5H1.3, p.s. The exceptions to this general rule 
are contained in the encouraged factors of subpart 5K2 of 
the guidelines. Of particular relevance to this case, section 
5K2.13 provides: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. An encouraged factor is not an appropriate basis for departure when 
the applicable guideline has taken the encouraged factor into account. 
For example, an upward departure for disruption of a governmental 
function, U.S.S.G. S 5K2.7, p.s., "ordinarily would not be justified when 
the offense of conviction is an offense such as bribery or obstruction of 
justice; in such cases interference with a governmental function is 
inherent in the offense." Id. Where the applicable guidelines do take the 
encouraged factor into account, departure is warranted "only if the factor 
is present to a degree substantially in excess of that which ordinarily is 
involved in the offense." U.S.S.G. S 5K2.0, p.s. 
 
5. If a proposed departure factor is not mentioned in the guidelines, the 
sentencing court "must, taking into consideration the structure and 
theory of both relevant individual guidelines and the guidelines taken as 
a whole, determine whether the circumstances presented are sufficient to 
remove the case from the heartland of the applicable guideline." United 
States v. Sally, 116 F.3d 76, 80 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. 
Brock, 108 F.3d 31, 35 (4th Cir. 1997)). 
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       If the defendant committed a non-violent offense while 
       suffering from significantly reduced mental capacity 
       not resulting from voluntary use of drugs or other 
       intoxicants, a lower sentence may be warranted to 
       reflect the extent to which reduced mental capacity 
       contributed to the commission of the offense, provided 
       that the defendant's criminal history does not indicate 
       a need for incarceration to protect the public. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 5K2.13, p.s. Section 5K2.13 is an encouraged 
departure. United States v. Askari, No. 95-1662, 1997 WL 
92051, *5 (3d Cir. March 5, 1997) (Becker, J., concurring), 
reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 1997 WL 92051, *6 
(March 27, 1997); see also United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 
942, 948 (1st Cir. 1993) ("The individual guidelines do not 
take into account, for example, of an offender's`diminished 
capacity,' which circumstance, in the Commission's view 
would normally warrant a downward departure."). Thus, 
while mental and emotional conditions are not ordinarily 
relevant in determining whether a downward departure is 
warranted, one suffering from a "significantly reduced 
mental capacity" may be eligible for such a departure. 
 
2. 
 
McBroom moved the district court for a downward 
departure based on, among other things, his claim 
pursuant to section 5K2.13 that he suffered from a 
significantly reduced mental capacity due to the sexual 
abuse he had endured as a child, and that this reduced 
capacity compelled him to possess child pornography.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The encouraged factor of section 5K2.13 is not taken into account by 
the guideline provisions applicable to this case, and so the district 
court 
was authorized to depart if it found that McBroom satisfied the 
requirements of section 5K2.13. Koon, 116 S.Ct. at 2045. 
 
McBroom also sought a downward departure on the grounds that (1) 
his criminal history category of two overstated the seriousness of his 
past criminal conduct and the likelihood that he would commit other 
crimes; and (2) mitigating circumstances existed due to recently renewed 
family ties. The district court rejected both of these grounds for 
McBroom's request, and McBroom does not contest these rulings on 
appeal. 
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Before a district court may exercise its discretion to 
depart pursuant to section 5K2.13, a defendant must 
prove, among other things, that (1) the offense is"non- 
violent" and (2) a significantly reduced mental capacity 
contributed to commission of the offense. United States v. 
Rosen, 896 F.2d 789, 791 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. 
McDowell, 888 F.2d 285, 291 (3d Cir. 1989) (defendant 
usually bears burden of persuasion when attempting to 
justify downward departure). The defendant must prove 
these elements by a preponderance of the evidence. See 
McDowell, 888 F.2d at 291. 
 
The district court concluded without discussion that "it is 
clear that [McBroom] committed a crime that is non- 
violent." Slip. Op. at 7-8. The court then turned to the issue 
of whether McBroom suffered from a significantly reduced 
mental capacity which contributed to the commission of the 
offense. 
 
In support of his motion, McBroom submitted the 
affidavit we cited extensively above as well as letters from 
three medical professionals. After his arrest, McBroom 
began to see psychotherapist Edward Crowley on a regular 
basis. McBroom was also referred to Dr. Richard Gartner, 
a clinical psychologist, and Dr. Ronald Winchel, a licensed 
psychiatrist and psychopharmacologist. McBroom Aff., at 
PP 59-61. 
 
In a letter submitted to the sentencing court, Crowley 
wrote that "McBroom developed a compulsion with regard 
to viewing pornography. . . . Although Mr. McBroom 
understood the moral and legal implications of this activity, 
he was unable to discontinue the practice. . . . It is evident 
that Mr. McBroom is experiencing the symptoms of a 
person who has been sexually abused as a child. . . . The 
excessive use of pornography by Mr. McBroom is also a 
common behavior pattern of survivors of childhood abuse." 
 
In a letter submitted to the sentencing court, Dr. Gartner 
reported that "McBroom as an adolescent and adult has 
exhibited many of the most common sequelae of childhood 
sexual abuse, particularly abuse by a loved caretaker and 
role model. His symptoms have included a wide spectrum 
of obsessive and compulsive behaviors, including severe 
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alcoholism and drug abuse, sexual compulsivity 
(particularly related to pornography) . . . . His recent 
fascination with pornography involving underage girls 
seems to reflect a sense of his own undeveloped and 
unevolved adolescent sexual identity. This is probably 
related to his traumatic preadolescent and adolescent 
molestation, and his consequent dread of adult sexuality as 
well as fascination with adolescent sexuality." 
 
In a brief letter submitted to the sentencing court, Dr. 
Winchel reported that he diagnosed McBroom as having 
Cyclothymic Disorder (a bipolar mood disorder) and 
Impulse Control Disorder. 
 
The district court found that McBroom suffered from 
bipolar disorder, manic depression, and multiple disorders 
of impulse control. Additionally, the court found that 
McBroom suffered from a childhood and adolescence 
seriously marred by continuous sexual abuse at the hands 
of his father. The court was hesitant, however, tofind that 
McBroom's "troubled childhood" qualified him for a 
departure from the guideline range. 
 
The court then noted that "courts have found that a 
downward departure is unavailable where there was `no 
indication that [the defendant] was unable to process 
information or to reason.' " Slip Op. at 10 (quoting United 
States v. Johnson, 979 F.2d 396, 401 (6th Cir. 1992)). 
According to the court, "a defendant able to absorb 
information in the usual way and to exercise the power of 
reason is not suffering from a significantly reduced mental 
capacity under U.S.S.G. S 5K2.13." Slip Op. at 10 
(quotations omitted). 
 
The district court denied McBroom's request for a 
downward departure. The court was persuaded by the fact 
that McBroom did not claim that he "does not voluntarily 
participate in the transmissions of child pornography, nor 
does he claim that he did not understand what he was 
doing or the wrongful nature of his acts." Slip Op. at 10. 
According to the court, 
 
        [McBroom] clearly possessed his mental and 
       intellectual faculties and was capable of exercising the 
       power of reason. Not only did [McBroom] enter the 
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       Internet to explore its cache of child pornography, but 
       [he] also engaged in complex transactions across the 
       Internet. He knowingly formed criminal networks of 
       child pornography suppliers and collectors with whom 
       to share unlawful materials, thereby fueling the market 
       for child pornography. 
 
        Because there is no evidence that [McBroom's] 
       mental capacity was significantly reduced, there exists 
       no factual basis upon which the Court can grant a 
       departure. 
 
Id. The district court sentenced McBroom to fifteen months 
in prison, the minimum sentence for a person with an 
offense level of thirteen and a criminal history category of II. 
 
McBroom moved the district court to reconsider its 
decision not to depart downward under section 5K2.13. In 
support of his motion, McBroom submitted two 
supplemental reports. 
 
In the first supplemental report, Dr. Gartner stated that 
McBroom has exhibited symptoms of childhood sexual 
abuse, including a "wide spectrum of obsessive and 
compulsive behaviors . . . . This compulsivity has extended 
to viewing pornography, usually pictures of adults but 
including pornographic pictures of young girls that were 
sent to him on the Internet." Dr. Gartner concluded: "[T]his 
compulsivity led to a significantly reduced mental state 
which contributed in a large degree to Mr. McBroom's 
commission of the offense for which he has been convicted." 
 
In the second supplemental report, Dr. Winchel 
commented that "[i]f the phrase `significantly reduced 
mental state' is intended to include a reduced capacity for 
choice, and acting under the influence of compulsion, 
resultant from a psychiatric disorder, then Mr. McBroom's 
condition, in my view, amply fulfills that definition." Dr. 
Winchel stated that "McBroom, at various times in his life, 
has fulfilled criteria for 4 different disorders of impulse 
control." 
 
Dr. Winchel explained that individuals suffering from an 
impulse disorder have an "overwhelming quality of the urge 
to commit the action toward which the individual feels 
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driven. In most cases of impulse disorder, attempts to not 
act in accordance with the compulsion is associated with 
increasingly painful states of tension and agitation which 
can generate profound mental suffering." 
 
Dr. Winchel cautioned that the impulse disorder may not 
be obvious in syndromes where there may appear to be a 
motive for the individual's actions: "the apparent potential 
for erotic pleasure present when any person looks at 
pornography may inhibit understanding of the 
overwhelmingly compulsive nature that some experience -- 
a phenomenon which is not about erotic gratification, but 
about an attempt to control the overwhelming mental pain 
and tension that may accompany an unfulfilled 
compulsion." Dr. Winchel concluded that McBroom's 
"actions and mental states in regard to the pornographic 
material contain evidence of impulsive discontrol of his 
behavior." 
 The district court denied McBroom's motion for 
reconsideration.7 McBroom timely appealed from the court's 
judgment of sentence. 
 
On appeal, McBroom does not argue that the district 
court erred when it found that he is able to absorb 
information in the usual way and to exercise the power of 
reason. Rather, he contends that the court took too narrow 
a view of the term "significantly reduced mental capacity" 
and thereby improperly excluded from section 5K2.13 
certain individuals who, while able to absorb information in 
the usual way and to exercise the power of reason, are 
incapable of controlling their behavior and conforming it to 
the law. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 35, the district court concluded that it lacked 
jurisdiction to reconsider a criminal sentence. The court also noted that 
it did not overlook any dispositive factual matters or controlling 
decisions of law in its sentencing decision; according to the court, 
counsel had the opportunity to, and did, introduce information on 
McBroom's psychiatric state before sentencing. 
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C. 
 
Our jurisdiction over this appeal is grounded in 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291 and 18 U.S.C. S 3742. The district court denied 
McBroom's motion for a downward departure because it 
believed that it lacked discretion to depart from the 
guidelines range. Specifically, the court held that "a 
defendant able to absorb information in the usual way and 
to exercise the power of reason" is not entitled to a 
downward departure, and then it determined that McBroom 
was able to reason and to absorb information in the usual 
way. Slip Op. at 10.8 Because the court believed that a 
departure was legally impermissible under the guidelines, 
we have jurisdiction to determine whether the court's 
understanding of the guidelines was correct. United States 
v. Denardi, 892 F.2d 269, 272 (3d Cir. 1989); see also 
United States v. Mummert, 34 F.3d 201, 205 (3d Cir. 1994); 
United States v. Hamilton, 949 F.2d 190, 193 (6th Cir. 
1991) (per curiam) (district court's conclusion that type of 
mental state claimed by defendant does not fit within 
section 5K2.13 is legal conclusion reviewable on appeal); 
United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 590-91 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(en banc) (same).9 
 
Whether a factor is a permissible basis for departure is a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 8. The court resolved any possible doubts about the reason for its 
sentencing decision at McBroom's bail hearing: 
 
       I was very careful, I was very careful in that decision. I didn't 
say I 
       had the authority to depart and I chose not to depart; because I 
       wanted that issue presented to the appellate court. And I made it 
       very clear that I was making a decision not on the exercise of 
       discretion, but on the basis that I did not have the discretion as 
I 
       read the Guidelines. So there is an issue on appeal that has to be 
       addressed by the Circuit Court. 
 
While we are not bound by the district court's understanding of its own 
decision, it is apparent that the district court believed that it was 
without discretion to depart from the guidelines pursuant to section 
5K2.13. 
 
9. In contrast, if the court's ruling had been based on an exercise of 
discretion, we would have lacked jurisdiction to review the court's 
exercise of that discretion. Denardi, 892 F.2d at 272; Mummert, 34 F.3d 
at 205. 
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question of law, Koon v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 
2047 (1996), and our review of the sentencing court's 
construction of the Sentencing Guidelines is therefore 
plenary. United States v. Oser, 107 F.3d 1080, 1083 (3d 
Cir. 1997). We review the specific question of whether the 
district court had the authority to depart downward based 
on the factor of diminished capacity under an abuse of 
discretion standard. United States v. Sally, 116 F.3d 76, 78 
(3d Cir. 1997). In addition to permitting an appellate court 
to review the exercise of a district court's discretion for 
abuse, the abuse of discretion standard allows us to 
determine whether the district court was guided by 
erroneous legal conclusions when exercising its discretion. 
Koon, 116 S.Ct. at 2047-48. An abuse of discretion 
standard does not mean, therefore, that a mistake of law is 
beyond appellate correction. "A district court by definition 
abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law." Id. at 
2047. 
 
III. 
 
Before we reach the question of whether McBroom 
suffered from a significantly reduced mental capacity, we 
must determine whether McBroom committed a "non- 
violent offense." A downward departure pursuant to section 
5K2.13 is not available to any defendant, regardless of the 
state of his or her mental capacity, if the offense of 
conviction is not "non-violent." The defendant bears the 
burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
the crime is non-violent. United States v. Rosen , 896 F.2d 
789, 791 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. McDowell, 888 
F.2d 285, 291 (3d Cir. 1989). The district court did not 
dwell on this issue; according to the court, "it is clear that 
[McBroom] committed a crime that is non-violent." 
 
In this appeal, the government contends that the crime of 
possession of child pornography is not a "non-violent 
offense" and that McBroom is therefore not entitled to a 
downward departure under section 5K2.13. 
 
A. 
 
In Rosen, the defendant was convicted on a plea of guilty 
to the charge of sending a threatening communication 
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through the mail with the intent to extort money through 
threat of injury in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 876. 896 F.2d at 
790. We rejected the defendant's claim that the offense was 
non-violent because it did not involve the actual use of 
physical force, and we held that the district court did not 
have the authority to depart downward under section 
5K2.13 because the offense was not a "non-violent offense." 
Id. at 791. 
 
The basis for our holding in Rosen was that the definition 
of "crime of violence" contained in section 4B1.2, which is 
the career offender provision, governs the meaning of "non- 
violent offense" in section 5K2.13. Id. According to section 
4B1.2, the term "crime of violence" means any offense 
under federal or state law punishable by imprisonment for 
a term exceeding one year that (1) "has as an element the 
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 
against the person of another," or (2) is "burglary of a 
dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or 
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential 
risk of physical injury to another." U.S.S.G.S 4B1.2(1); see 
also U.S.S.G. S 4B1.2, comment. (n.1-2) (providing 
additional discussion of term "crime of violence"). Because 
the defendant's crime of extortion had as an element the 
threatened use of force, the crime was a "crime of violence" 
under section 4B1.2 and was not, therefore, a "non-violent 
offense" under section 5K2.13. Rosen, 896 F.2d at 791. 
 
Bound as we are by our decision in Rosen, 3d Cir. I.O.P. 
9.1, we conclude that the offense of possession of child 
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 2252(a)(4) is a "non- 
violent offense." The mere possession of child pornography 
does not have as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person of 
another, and it is not the type of offense listed in section 
4B1.2(1) or the application notes to section 4B1.2. 
Possession of child pornography is not, therefore, a "crime 
of violence," and, pursuant to Rosen, it must be a "non- 
violent offense."10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. We acknowledge that the term "crime of violence" is defined in 18 
U.S.C. S 3156(a)(4) to include any felony under chapter 109A or chapter 
110 of Title 18, including possession of child pornography. While we are 
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B. 
 
We recognize that our holding in Rosen that the term 
"crime of violence" means the opposite of the term "non- 
violent offense" is currently the subject of considerable 
debate. Five other courts of appeals have reached the same 
conclusion that we reached in Rosen. United States v. 
Mayotte, 76 F.3d 887, 889 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Dailey, 24 F.3d 1323, 1325-27 (11th Cir. 1994); United 
States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 591-93 (7th Cir. 1991) (en 
banc); United States v. Borrayo, 898 F.2d 91, 94 (9th Cir. 
1989); United States v. Maddalena, 893 F.2d 815, 819 (6th 
Cir. 1989). Two courts of appeals, however, following the 
dissent in Poff, 926 F.2d at 593-96 (Easterbrook, J., 
dissenting), have concluded that the "non-violent offense" 
requirement of section 5K2.13 is not governed by the"crime 
of violence" definition contained in section 4B1.2. United 
States v. Weddle, 30 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir. 1994); United 
States v. Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
Rather, those courts believe that "the sentencing court has 
broad discretion under section 5K2.13 to examine all the 
facts and circumstances of a case to determine whether a 
particular offense was in fact `non-violent.' " Chatman, 986 
F.2d at 1450. 
 
Our court, sitting en banc, may soon revisit the issue in 
United States v. Askari, No. 95-1662, 1997 WL 92051 (3d 
Cir. March 5, 1997) (per curiam), reh'g en banc granted, 
opinion vacated, 1997 WL 92051, *6 (March 27, 1997). In 
Askari, we held that an unarmed bank robbery is not a 
"non-violent offense" under section 5K2.13 because it is a 
"crime of violence" under section 4B1.2. 1997 WL 92051, *2 
(citing Rosen, 896 F.2d at 791). In a concurring opinion in 
which he urged us to reconsider the issue en banc, Judge 
Becker wrote that "it does not make sense to import a 
career offender-based definition of `crime of violence' into a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
concerned that Congress, in 18 U.S.C. S 3156, and the Sentencing 
Commission, in U.S.S.G. S 4B1.2, chose to define a single term -- "crime 
of violence" -- in very different ways, the definition contained in 
section 
3156(a)(4) is only applicable to the term as used in 18 U.S.C. SS 3141- 
3150. Since we applied the guidelines definition of "crime of violence" in 
Rosen, we do the same here. 
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departure section in the absence of a specific cross- 
reference." "Rather," Judge Becker concluded, "it is better 
to permit the district courts to consider all the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the commission of a crime 
when deciding whether it qualifies as a non-violent offense 
under S 5K2.13." 1997 WL 92051, *6. We granted rehearing 
en banc and vacated the per curiam opinion. 
 
Recognizing that we are presently bound by Rosen and 
that possession of child pornography is a "non-violent 
offense" under our precedent, we nonetheless briefly 
analyze the subject offense under the case-by-case 
approach suggested by Judge Easterbrook in Poff and by 
Judge Becker in Askari. We do so not to predict how the en 
banc court will decide Askari, but because we conclude 
that, even under the case-by-case approach, the possession 
of child pornography is a "non-violent offense." 
 
According to the government, "[p]ossession and 
dissemination of child pornography, by statutory definition, 
entails the sexual exploitation of minors, which, in any 
form, entails violence against children. . . . With each 
computer transmission of child pornography, not only is 
the child who is depicted victimized yet at least a trace 
more, but the market for child pornography is fueled, 
pedophiles potentially inspired, and more children 
ultimately victimized." We are not unsympathetic to the 
government's concerns; possession of child pornography is 
not a victimless crime. See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 2 
F.3d 1318, 1328 n.12 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing harm 
Congress sought to avoid by punishing possession of child 
pornography). 
 
A review of the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
commission of the crime, however, persuades us that the 
mere possession of child pornography in this context is a 
"non-violent offense." Initially, the crime for which 
McBroom was convicted, possession of child pornography 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 2252(a)(4), does not have as an 
element the use of physical force or violence. McBroom was 
convicted of a crime of possession, not a crime of violence. 
 
In addition, McBroom was not convicted of any offenses 
involving contact with children or the production of child 
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pornography. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. S 2251 (sexual 
exploitation of children); id. S 2251A (selling or buying of 
children). On the record here, McBroom had no direct 
contact with children in furtherance of his efforts to 
possess child pornography, and he did not solicit others to 
sexually exploit children in order to obtain additional 
depictions. He was also not convicted of transporting or 
receiving child pornography. Id. S 2252(a)(1), (2). 
 
The record is devoid of any evidence that McBroom's 
conduct involved "violence in fact." Askari, 1997 WL 92051, 
*2 (Becker, J., concurring). The record indicates that 
McBroom downloaded images of child pornography from 
the abundance of images already available on the Internet, 
and that he stored those images on his computer's hard 
drive. 
 
Finally, McBroom's conduct did not involve a threat of 
violence. Compare Poff, 926 F.2d at 594 (Easterbrook, J., 
dissenting) ("A `non-violent offense' . . . is one in which 
mayhem did not occur."), with Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1454 
(an offense that never resulted in physical violence but that 
did involve a "real and serious" threat of violence is not a 
"non-violent" offense).11 
 
As the government argues, it is the market for child 
pornography that ultimately leads to the victimization of 
children, and McBroom was surely part of that market. 
This fact does not make McBroom the perpetrator of a 
violent offense, however, any more than a possessor of 
marijuana contributes to the often-violent illicit drug trade. 
Assuming section 5K2.13 required us to decide whether a 
particular defendant committed a "non-violent offense" as a 
matter of fact, we would look first to the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense 
of conviction, and not to the derivative, but potentially 
inevitable, consequences of the defendant's conduct. 
 
Because the commission of the crime for which McBroom 
was convicted did not involve any actual or threatened 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Of course, we need not and do not decide whether, and at what 
point, an offense involving threatened violence (but no violence in fact) 
would not be a "non-violent offense" under the case-by-case approach. 
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violence in fact, and because the use or threat of force is 
not an element of the crime, we believe that, under the 
case-by-case approach suggested by Judge Easterbrook in 
Poff and by Judge Becker in Askari, McBroom committed a 
"non-violent offense." Of course, as noted above, our 
conclusion that McBroom committed a "non-violent offense" 
is anchored in our conclusion that possession of child 
pornography is not a "crime of violence" under section 
4B1.2 of the guidelines. Rosen, 896 F.2d at 791. 
 
Having determined that McBroom "committed a non- 
violent offense," we must now decide whether the district 
court properly considered McBroom's claim that he 
committed that offense "while suffering from significantly 
reduced mental capacity." U.S.S.G. S 5K2.13, p.s. 
 
IV. 
 
McBroom contends that the definition of "significantly 
reduced mental capacity" contains a volitional component 
not adequately considered by the district court. We agree. 
We believe that a defendant's ability to control his or her 
own conduct is a relevant consideration when determining 
the defendant's eligibility for a downward departure 
pursuant to section 5K2.13. 
 
A. 
 
Our analysis begins with a brief look back to the modern 
dawn of common law recognition of insanity as a defense to 
criminal charges. In M'Naghten's Case, the House of Lords 
ruled that the insanity defense applies if the accused "was 
labouring under such a defect of reason, from a disease of 
the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act 
he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he 
was doing what was wrong." 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210, 8 Eng. 
Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843). 
 
In the twentieth century, the M'Naghten Rule came under 
heavy criticism because it "misleadingly focused attention 
on the capacity to distinguish `right' from `wrong' at a time 
when recognized psychiatric impairments were understood 
as unitary entities which distorted both cognitive and 
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effective capacities." Government of Virgin Islands v. 
Fredericks, 578 F.2d 927, 937 (3d Cir. 1978) (Adams, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis supplied); see also Durham v. United 
States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (rejecting M'Naghten 
Rule). In 1955, the American Law Institute introduced an 
alternative to the Rule, which was subsequently adopted 
into the Model Penal Code. The ALI standard provides: 
 
       A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at 
       the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease 
       or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to 
       appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct 
       or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. 
 
Model Penal Code S 4.01(1) (emphasis supplied). The ALI 
standard is significant because it introduced a "volitional 
prong," which considers defects of control, in addition to the 
"cognitive prong," already present in the M'Naghten Rule, 
which considers only defects of reason and intellect. 
 
In United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961), 
we too rejected the M'Naghten Rule as "unworkable" and a 
"sham." Id. at 765. We noted that a test based on one's 
ability to know right from wrong misses the point: "Our 
institutions contain many patients who are insane or 
mentally ill or mentally diseased and who know the 
difference between right and wrong." Id. at 765. 
 
Faced with the difficult task of formulating a proper test, 
we focused on the element of control: 
 
        The concept of mens rea, guilty mind, is based on the 
       assumption that a person has a capacity to control his 
       behavior and to choose between alternative courses of 
       conduct. This assumption, though not unquestioned by 
       theologians, philosophers and scientists, is necessary 
       to the maintenance and administration of social 
       controls. It is only through this assumption that 
       society has found it possible to impose duties and 
       create liabilities designed to safeguard persons and 
       property. . . . Essentially these duties and liabilities are 
       intended to operate upon the human capacity for 
       choice and control of conduct so as to inhibit and deter 
       socially harmful conduct. When a person possessing 
       capacity for choice and control, nevertheless breaches 
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       a duty of this type he is subjected to the sanctions of 
       the criminal law. He is subject to these sanctions not 
       because of the act alone, but because of his failure to 
       exercise his capacity to control his behavior in 
       conformity with the demands of society. 
 Id. at 773. We concluded that "the sanctions of the criminal 
law are meted out in accordance with the actor's capacity 
to conform his conduct to society's standards, through the 
capacity for choice and control which he possessed with 
respect to his act." Id. 
 
We thus announced the following test: "The jury must be 
satisfied that at the time of committing the prohibited act 
the defendant, as a result of a mental disease or defect, 
lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law which he is alleged to have 
violated." Id. at 774. 
 
The Currens "capacity to conform" test was drawn in part 
from the test proposed by the American Law Institute in its 
Model Penal Code. Id. at 774 n.32. We intentionally did not 
adopt the phrase "to appreciate the criminality of his 
conduct" from the Model Penal Code, however, finding that 
the phrase would "overemphasize the cognitive element in 
criminal responsibility and thus distract the jury from the 
crucial issues while being little more than surplusage." Id. 
 
We utilized the Currens test until Congress provided a 
statutory formulation of the federal insanity defense by 
passing the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-473, Title II, S 402(a), 98 Stat. 2057, S 20, recodified 
at 18 U.S.C. S 17 ("IDRA"). The IDRA provides: 
 
       It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any 
       Federal statute that, at the time of the commission of 
       the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a 
       result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable 
       to appreciate the nature and quality or the 
       wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect does 
       not otherwise constitute a defense. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 17(a). Congress thus deleted the "volitional 
prong" of the insanity defense found in both the Model 
Penal Code and in Currens, United States v. Pohlot, 827 
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F.2d 889, 896 (3d Cir. 1987), in favor of exclusive reliance 
on the "cognitive prong" of M'Naghten's Case.12 Indeed, the 
IDRA, with its emphasis on an accused's ability to 
appreciate the nature and quality, or the wrongfulness, of 
his or her actions, is, at its core, a modern version of the 
M'Naghten Rule. 
 
B. 
 
When the Sentencing Commission promulgated policy 
statement 5K2.13, it did not define the term "significantly 
reduced mental capacity." We do not believe, however, that 
the Commission intended to preclude district courts from 
considering volitional impairments during the sentencing 
phase in the same manner in which Congress precluded 
consideration of volitional impairments as an affirmative 
insanity defense. 
 
The IDRA does not permit a defendant to rely on a 
mental disease or defect as an affirmative insanity defense 
unless the disease or defect renders the accused unable to 
appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of 
his acts. This is true even if the disease or defect 
substantially contributed to the commission of the offense. 
In sharp contrast, when a court considers the sentencing of 
a convicted defendant, guideline section 5K2.13 may apply 
once the accused's reduced mental capacity "contributed to 
the commission of the offense" -- without regard to how the 
reduced mental capacity so contributed. U.S.S.G. S 5K2.13, 
p.s. 
 
For example, if a defendant's reduced mental capacity 
prevents the individual from appreciating the wrongfulness 
of certain conduct, section 5K2.13 may apply so long as the 
other requirements of that section are satisfied (and 
assuming the defendant is not entitled to a complete 
affirmative insanity defense pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 17). 
Likewise, if an individual is capable of appreciating the 
nature, quality, and wrongfulness of certain acts, but is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Defendants may still introduce evidence of mental abnormality in 
order to negate mens rea and disprove an element of the crime itself. 
Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 895-902. 
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unable to control the conduct due to reduced mental 
capacity, section 5K2.13 may also apply. Thus, section 
5K2.13 retains both a "cognitive prong" and a "volitional 
prong." 
 
This interpretation of section 5K2.13 makes sense. The 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explained: 
 
       [I]n the criminal law generally, and under the 
       guidelines as well, though no longer in the federal 
       defense of insanity, 18 U.S.C. S 17(a), the term `mental 
       capacity' refers to action as well as to understanding. 
       The mind is the organ of volition as well as of 
       reflection. A person who knows what he is doing and 
       that it is wrong but cannot control himself is deficient 
       in mental capacity. 
 
United States v. Pullen, 89 F.3d 368, 370-71 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(internal citations omitted), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 706 
(1997). The court thus recognized that the term"mental 
capacity" as used in section 5K2.13 encompasses both a 
cognition prong and a volition prong. We agree. 
 
In Currens, we reasoned that the duties and liabilities 
imposed by our society on its members are "intended to 
operate upon the human capacity for choice and control of 
conduct so as to inhibit and deter socially harmful 
conduct." 290 F.2d at 773 (emphasis supplied). Since 
passage of the IDRA, this rationale no longer applies to 
individuals pleading insanity as an affirmative defense. It 
remains viable, however, in the sentencing phase. As we 
stated in Currens, our system of criminal justice punishes 
criminals not because of the act alone, but because of the 
offender's failure to exercise his capacity to control his 
behavior in conformity with the demands of society. Id. 
Justice demands that sentencing courts be able to consider 
an offender's capacity to control his behavior before 
determining an appropriate sentence. Section 5K2.13 
provides courts with the ability to do just that. 
 
Judge Easterbrook explained why it is appropriate to 
consider volitional impairments in making sentencing 
determinations: 
 
       The criminal justice system long has meted out lower 
       sentences to persons who, although not technically 
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       insane, are not in full command of their actions. . . . 
       Persons who find it difficult to control their conduct do 
       not -- considerations of dangerousness to one side-- 
       deserve as much punishment as those who act 
       maliciously or for gain. 
 
Poff, 926 F.2d at 595 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). We 
agree. 
 
C. 
 
The issue of volitional incapacity as a basis for downward 
departure has rarely been directly addressed by the courts. 
The courts have instead focused on defendants' cognitive 
abilities. In United States v. Hamilton, 949 F.2d 190 (6th 
Cir. 1991) (per curiam), the defendant pled guilty to 
possession of controlled substances with intent to 
distribute. The defendant asserted that a gambling disorder 
caused him to suffer from a "significantly reduced mental 
capacity." Id. at 191. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit disagreed, finding that the defendant "was able to 
absorb information in the usual way and to exercise the 
power of reason. He took to selling drugs illegally not 
because of any inability to understand his situation, but 
because he needed money." Id. at 193. 
 
While the court relied on the defendant's ability to 
"absorb information in the usual way and to exercise the 
power of reason" when rejecting his claim for a downward 
departure, the court did not cite to any legal or medical 
authority for its apparent conclusion that an individual's 
ability to absorb information and to reason is equated with 
his "mental capacity." Nevertheless, the court's emphasis 
on the defendant's intellectual, or cognitive, capacity was 
soon replicated. 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit adopted the 
Hamilton standard in United States v. Goossens, 84 F.3d 
697 (4th Cir. 1996). The district court found that Goossens 
had been diagnosed as suffering from anxiety disorder and 
had other psychological problems. Id. at 699-700. 
Nonetheless, Goossens was a man of "above average 
intellectual capacity," possessed a "high level of mental 
functioning," and "was employed in a responsible position." 
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Id. at 701. The court of appeals held that "in order for a 
defendant's mental condition to be considered `a 
significantly reduced mental capacity' within the meaning of 
S 5K2.13, p.s., the defendant must have been unable to 
process information or to reason." Id. The court concluded 
that Goossens was not entitled to a downward departure 
under section 5K2.13 because of his above-average 
cognitive function. 
 
It thus appears that, for some of our sister courts of 
appeals, an individual's inability to reason or to absorb 
information in the usual way is the sine qua non of reduced 
mental capacity, and a defendant who is able to reason and 
to absorb information in the usual way is ineligible for a 
downward departure under section 5K2.13. See, e.g., 
United States v. Withers, 100 F.3d 1142, 1148 (4th Cir. 
1996) (defendant ineligible for downward departure because 
she failed to show that her depression rendered her unable 
to process information or to reason; "she was fully capable 
of following a complex set of instructions to transport 
heroin successfully into the United States"), cert. denied, 
117 S.Ct. 1282 (1997); United States v. Edwards, 98 F.3d 
1364, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (rejecting defendant's argument 
that "mental capacity" has meaning apart from intellectual 
capacity; holding that psychological or behavioral disorders 
could not serve as basis for departure based on reduced 
mental capacity absent "accompanying inability to reason"), 
cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1437 (1997); United States v. 
Barajas-Nunez, 91 F.3d 826, 831 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(diminished mental capacity is found where defendant's 
condition affects ability to process information or to 
reason); United States v. Johnson, 979 F.2d 396, 401 (6th 
Cir. 1992) (defendant, who "displayed considerable mental 
agility in his professional and personal affairs," was able to 
process information and to reason; section 5K2.13 
downward departure held unavailable). 
 
Our sister courts' apparent focus on an offender's ability 
to absorb information and to reason may be more the result 
of the arguments raised by the offenders in each specific 
case than of a conscious decision to disregard volitional 
impairments. Indeed, we are in agreement with these courts 
that a sentencing court may consider a defendant's 
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cognitive incapacity during the sentencing phase. To the 
extent that some of these courts have purposely limited 
section 5K2.13 to its cognitive prong, however, we cannot 
agree to such a narrow reading of the guidelines. 
 
Section 5K2.13 is intended to create lenity for those 
whose significantly reduced mental capacity cause them to 
commit the offense of conviction. In United States v. 
Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1993), the court 
recognized that the purpose of section 5K2.13 is to "treat 
with lenity" individuals whose significantly reduced mental 
capacity contributed to the commission of the crime. Id. at 
1452. The court reasoned that such lenity is appropriate 
because "two of the primary rationales for punishing an 
individual by incarceration -- desert and deterrence -- lose 
some of their relevance when applied to those with reduced 
mental capacity." Id. 
 
Likewise, in United States v. Cantu, 12 F.3d 1506 (9th 
Cir. 1993), the court of appeals recognized that "[l]enity is 
appropriate because the purpose of S 5K2.13 is to treat with 
some compassion those in whom a reduced mental capacity 
has contributed to the commission of a crime." Id. at 1511. 
The courts' discussions of lenity in Chatman and Cantu 
apply with equal force to those who cannot comprehend 
right from wrong and to those who cannot control their 
behavior. See United States v. Weddle, 30 F.3d 532, 540 
(4th Cir. 1994) (section 5K2.13 creates lenity for those who 
cannot control their actions but who are not actually 
dangerous). 
 
D. 
 
We conclude that the Sentencing Commission intended to 
include those with cognitive impairments and those with 
volitional impairments within the definition of "reduced 
mental capacity." We believe that the following test 
adequately addresses our concerns that a sentencing court 
consider both a defendant's cognitive capacity and his or 
her volitional capacity when considering a downward 
departure pursuant to section 5K2.13: A person may be 
suffering from a "reduced mental capacity" for the purposes 
of section 5K2.13 if either: 
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       (1) the person is unable to absorb information in the 
       usual way or to exercise the power of reason; or 
 
       (2) the person knows what he is doing and that it is 
       wrong but cannot control his behavior or conform 
       it to the law. 
 
The first prong permits sentencing courts to consider 
defects of cognition. The second prong permits sentencing 
courts to consider defects of volition. Sentencing courts 
must consider both prongs before making a determination 
about a defendant's "reduced mental capacity." 
 
We are reminded that a mere reduction in mental 
capacity is not sufficient to warrant a departure; section 
5K2.13 requires that the reduced mental capacity be 
"significant" before a downward departure may be 
considered.13 Likewise, a departure, if granted, should 
reflect the extent to which the offender's reduced mental 
capacity contributed to the commission of the offense.14 As 
we noted above, a departure may not be granted where the 
offense is not "non-violent," and a departure is not 
warranted when the defendant's criminal history indicates 
a need for incarceration to protect the public. In addition, 
the reduction in mental capacity may not be the result of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. We are reluctant to set forth general principles delineating when 
mental capacity is so "significantly reduced" as to warrant consideration 
for a downward departure. We rely instead on the sentencing court's 
"institutional advantage over appellate courts in making these sorts of 
determinations." United States v. Sally, 116 F.3d 76, 81 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(quoting Koon, 116 S.Ct. at 2047). The Court in Koon recognized the 
"special competence" of sentencing courts in determining "whether a 
discouraged factor nonetheless justifies departure because it is present 
in some unusual or exceptional way." Koon, 116 S.Ct. at 2047; cf. Sally, 
116 F.3d at 81 (leaving to district courts the determination of "what 
post-conviction rehabilitation efforts may be considered so extraordinary 
or exceptional as to warrant a downward departure"). We, likewise, 
believe that the district courts have the resources to determine whether 
a defendant's reduced mental capacity is "significant." 
 
14. A defendant's "significantly reduced mental capacity" must be a 
contributing cause of the offense, but need not be the sole cause. United 
States v. Soliman, 954 F.2d 1012, 1014 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Glick, 946 F.2d 335, 339 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Ruklick, 919 
F.2d 95, 97-98 (8th Cir. 1990). 
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the offender's voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants.15 
Taken together, the requirements of section 5K2.13 are not 
easily met. In addition, the district courts retain their 
discretion to deny a downward departure even when a 
defendant does satisfy his burden. We therefore believe that 
our decision will not open the floodgates to every defendant 
who "felt compelled" to commit a crime. 
 
We note that although a defendant must be suffering 
from something greater than mere "emotional problems" to 
obtain a downward departure, United States v. Gentry, 925 
F.2d 186, 188 (7th Cir. 1991), certain emotional conditions 
may be the cause of a defendant's significantly reduced 
mental capacity. In Cantu, the court of appeals noted that 
section 5K2.13 applies to both mental defects and 
emotional disorders: "Such applications are appropriate. To 
artificially distinguish organic syndromes (mental defects) 
from emotional disorders is to ignore the increasingly blurry 
line between them." Id. at 1512; see also id. ("Treating 
emotional illnesses in the same way that we do mental 
abnormalities furthers the purpose of S 5K2.13."). As the 
court concluded in Cantu, "[t]he focus of the guideline 
provision is reduced mental capacity, not the cause -- 
organic, behavioral, or both -- of the reduction." Id. 
(emphasis in original). 
 
V. 
 
We turn now to the case at hand. Guided by the 
standard first announced in Hamilton, the district court 
concluded that "a defendant able to absorb information in 
the usual way and to exercise the power of reason" is not 
eligible for a downward departure under section 5K2.13. 
According to the court, McBroom "clearly possessed his 
mental and intellectual faculties and was capable of 
exercising the power of reason." The court cited as an 
example of McBroom's intellectual capacity the fact that he 
"engaged in complex transactions across the Internet." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Although McBroom has a history of drug and alcohol abuse, the 
government does not contend that McBroom's use of drugs and alcohol 
caused him to suffer from a significantly reduced mental capacity. 
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On appeal, McBroom does not contend that he is unable 
to absorb information in the usual way or to exercise the 
power of reason. Rather, McBroom asserts that, despite his 
cognitive ability, he was unable to exercise control over his 
own behavior. It was the absence of volitional capacity, 
McBroom argues, that compelled him to view and possess 
child pornography. McBroom's ability to absorb information 
and to reason is therefore irrelevant to his efforts to obtain 
a downward departure. 
 
The reports submitted on behalf of McBroom contain 
information that is relevant to a determination regarding 
McBroom's volitional capacity. In a letter submitted to the 
sentencing court, Crowley wrote that "McBroom developed 
a compulsion with regard to viewing pornography. . .. 
Although Mr. McBroom understood the moral and legal 
implications of this activity, he was unable to discontinue 
the practice." Dr. Gartner reported that McBroom, like 
other victims of childhood sexual abuse, exhibited a 
number of obsessive and compulsive behaviors, including 
sexual compulsivity. Dr. Winchel reported that he 
diagnosed McBroom as having Cyclothymic Disorder (a 
bipolar mood disorder) and Impulse Control Disorder. 
According to the American Psychiatric Association, 
 
       The essential feature of Impulse-Control Disorders is 
       the failure to resist an impulse, drive, or temptation to 
       perform an act that is harmful to the person or to 
       others. For most of the disorders in this section, the 
       individual feels an increasing sense of tension or 
       arousal before committing the act and then experiences 
       pleasure, gratification, or relief at the time of 
       committing the act. Following the act there may or may 
       not be regret, self-reproach, or guilt. 
 
American Psychiatric Assoc., Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders 609 (4th ed. 1994) ("DSM-IV").16 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Dr. Winchel diagnosed McBroom as having "Impulse Control 
Disorder Not Otherwise Specified," classified as DSM-IV Code 312.30. 
This category is for disorders of impulse control that do not meet the 
criteria for any specific Impulse Control Disorder or for other mental 
disorders having features involving impulse control described elsewhere 
in DSM-IV. 
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As noted above, McBroom submitted two supplemental 
reports in support of his motion for reconsideration of the 
district court's sentencing decision. Dr. Gartner 
supplemented his initial report by stating that McBroom's 
obsessive and compulsive behaviors extended to child 
pornography. Dr. Gartner reported that McBroom suffered 
from obsessive-compulsive disorder complicated by 
Cyclothymia, an aftereffect of his childhood sexual abuse 
and a significant contributing factor in his possession of 
child pornography. In his supplemental report, Dr. Winchel 
stated that McBroom suffered from a psychiatric disorder 
that caused him to act under the influence of compulsion. 
 
We express no view about the merits of McBroom's claim 
of significantly reduced mental capacity. This determination 
should be made by the district court in the first instance.17 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
We are mindful of DSM-IV's "Cautionary Statement," which provides: 
 
       The purpose of DSM-IV is to provide clear descriptions of 
diagnostic 
       categories in order to enable clinicians and investigators to 
       diagnose, communicate about, study, and treat people with various 
       mental disorders. It is to be understood that inclusion here . . . 
does 
       not imply that the condition meets legal or other nonmedical 
criteria 
       for what constitutes mental disease, mental disorder, or mental 
       disability. The clinical and scientific considerations involved in 
       categorization of these conditions as mental disorders may not be 
       wholly relevant to legal judgments, for example, that take into 
       account such issues as individual responsibility, disability 
       determination, and competency. 
 
DSM-IV, at xxvii. While the term "mental capacity" as used in section 
5K2.13 is a legal, not a medical term, we believe that evaluation of a 
defendant's mental capacity must necessarily be informed by an 
appreciation and understanding of the defendant's medical condition. 
 
17. It is possible that the court may find that the evidence offered by 
McBroom is insufficient to establish a significantly reduced mental 
capacity. It is also possible that the court mayfind that McBroom 
suffered from a significantly reduced mental capacity but that it was 
unrelated to the commission of the offense. On the other hand, the 
district court might find that McBroom was unable to exercise control 
over his actions in possessing child pornography and that he suffered 
from a volitional impairment sufficient to warrant a downward departure 
under section 5K2.13. The court might also find that McBroom is eligible 
for a downward departure under section 5K2.13, but in the exercise of 
its discretion not grant such a departure. Otherfindings are also 
possible. 
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We leave it to the district court to determine whether 
McBroom suffered from a significantly reduced mental 
capacity and, if so, whether a departure is warranted and 
appropriate under section 5K2.13. Because we conclude 
that the court improperly limited its review to the issue of 
whether McBroom was able to absorb information in the 
usual way and to exercise the power of reason, however, we 
will remand so that the court may consider McBroom's 
assertion that he was unable to control his behavior or 
conform it to the law. 
 
How the district court chooses to undertake this analysis 
is a matter within its discretion. We think, however, that 
the court may not wish to decide this issue on the present 
record. It is apparent that, when it focused exclusively on 
McBroom's ability to absorb information in the usual way 
and to exercise the power of reason, the district court was 
guided by the principles announced by some of our sister 
courts of appeals. Those principles may have also guided 
the parties' argument and presentation of evidence. Given 
that the standard we announce today represents a different 
approach, the district court may wish to reopen the record 
and permit both McBroom and the government to submit 
new evidence and argument on the volitional incapacity 
issue. 
 
VI. 
 
We take this opportunity to address two additional 
concerns about the district court's first sentencing decision. 
 
First, the district court was persuaded in part by 
McBroom's ability to engage in complex transmissions 
across the Internet, and we are aware of McBroom's ability 
to practice law even as his consumption of alcohol, drugs, 
and pornography grew more severe. We note, however, that 
an individual's average or above-average mental capacity in 
one aspect of his or her affairs is not necessarily relevant to 
a determination about the individual's mental capacity in 
another aspect. If McBroom did suffer from an inability to 
control his behavior in the possession of child pornography, 
that does not necessarily mean that he was also unable to 
learn how to access the Internet or, for that matter, to 
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conduct a successful law practice. The converse is also 
true. The fact that McBroom may have been proficient on 
the Internet does not necessarily indicate that he was not 
compelled by reduced mental capacity to use that 
proficiency to obtain child pornography. 
 
On remand, the district court may certainly consider 
evidence of how McBroom conducted his affairs when 
determining whether he suffered from a significantly 
reduced mental capacity. We are mindful, however, that 
McBroom claims that he suffered from a very discrete 
volitional impairment, and evidence of advanced mental 
capacity in one area may not be relevant in deciding 
whether McBroom's claim has merit. 
 
Second, McBroom claims that his reduced mental 
capacity had its origins in the sexual abuse he suffered as 
a child. The court noted, however, that courts are hesitant 
to find a "troubled childhood" as a basis for departure from 
the guidelines range. The district court's concern may be 
unwarranted here. McBroom is not seeking a downward 
departure because he was a victim of sexual abuse. Rather, 
McBroom claims that at the time of the offense, he suffered 
from a significantly reduced mental capacity. McBroom 
points to his childhood merely to explain why his mental 
capacity was reduced to the point where he felt compelled 
to possess child pornography. 
 
When determining whether a defendant suffers from a 
significantly reduced mental capacity, a sentencing court 
may appropriately consider the asserted underlying cause 
of the impairment. The district court properly declined to 
consider McBroom's "troubled childhood" in a vacuum. 
U.S.S.G. S 5H1.12, p.s. ("Lack of guidance as a youth and 
similar circumstances indicating a disadvantaged 
upbringing are not relevant grounds for imposing a 
sentence outside the applicable guideline range."). On 
remand, however, the sentencing court may look to that 
childhood to inform its determination regarding whether 
McBroom suffered from a significantly reduced mental 
capacity at the time of the offense. 
 
In United States v. Withers, 100 F.3d 1142 (4th Cir. 
1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1282 (1997), the court of 
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appeals cautioned courts not to "create incentives for 
defendants to comb their personal circumstances in order 
to find evidence of hardship or misfortune. This search, we 
suspect, would almost always be fruitful given that 
adversity in its infinite variety comes with the journey of 
life." Id. at 1148; see also Pullen, 89 F.3d at 371 ("miserable 
family history" is not permissible basis for departure in 
average case). We emphasize that McBroom's "troubled 
childhood" is only relevant to its impact on his allegedly 
reduced mental capacity as an adult. McBroom's childhood 
experiences serve to place his volitional incapacity 
argument in context. It would be helpful to the sentencing 
court for McBroom's proffered experts, who report that 
McBroom suffers from a compulsion to view child 
pornography, to explain how that compulsion may have 
originated. 
 
VII. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the sentence 
imposed by the district court and remand for resentencing 
consistent with this opinion. 
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